MIRAGE: A Polarity-Flipping Encoding Subspace in LLM Agents

arXiv:2606. 10304v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: When LLM agents are coerced into covertly encoding sensitive data (Base64, ROT13, acrostic, synonym chains, and beyond), the resulting outputs evade output-side detection but the underlying computation does not. Across nine encoding families and eight models from five architecture families, that computation is supported by a shared low-dimensional encoding subspace in the residual stream.

A logistic-regression probe trained on eight encoding families recovers the held-out ninth at AUC 0. 975-1. 000, reading the computation rather than surface features. The same direction exhibits a second mechanistic signature at the planning token, flipping polarity to activate positively when the model will simulate the encoding inline and negatively when it will outsource it to a tool call, distinguishing two execution strategies before the encoded text exists.

We build MIRAGE (Model-Internal Readout of Agentic Generation Exfiltration), a two-channel real-time monitor exploiting both signals. On 126 agentic exfiltration scenarios, it reaches AUC = 0. 918, substantially outperforming output-only detection (AUC = 0. 518). Monitor performance is fundamentally a property of the host model's geometry: benign-encoding false-positive rate ranges from 0% on Qwen-7B to 100% on Phi-3.

5, revealing that the probe faithfully reads whether a model's geometry separates covert from overt encoding. Across all tested adversarial budgets, every attack suppressing the subspace also destroyed encoding fidelity, reported as an empirical regularity on the evaluated budgets, not a structural impossibility claim.